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Cover Illustration by John Tenniel from *Through the Looking Glass* (1871)

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Editorial

Many of our familiar myths and fairy tales feature mirrors and other glass devices. Carroll himself possessed a variety of optical lenses, microscopes, and telescopes. In our opening article Francesca Arnavas explores the Victorian fascination with the looking glass world and the creative imagination. The cognitive significance of reversal and duplication in the *Alice* stories is discussed.

The mirror metaphor might also apply to *The Hitch Hiker's Guide to Wonderland: Douglas Adams and Lewis Carroll*, Sarah Stanfield's revealing study of how and where Carroll is reflected in Douglas Adam's novels.

Between the completion of the original *Alice's Adventures Underground* and the publication of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, the "Jowett case" hit the headlines in the British Press. This produced, Carroll writes in his diary, "a flurry of letters to the Times" leading to correspondence about the concept of justice itself with Carroll's close acquaintance the theologian F. D. Maurice. Karen Gardiner's paper, *Escaping Justice in Wonderland*, sets out some possible links between this contentious ecclesiastical court case in 1863 with the 1865 publication of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* as we know it.

Jane Skelly

Cognitive Significance of Carrollian Mirrors: Creating and Re-Creating Alice's Worlds

Francesca Arnavas

George MacDonald, who was Carroll's friend and who populated his novels with mirrors too, gives this famous definition of mirrors' mysterious power:

What a strange thing a mirror is! And what a wondrous affinity exists between it and a man's imagination! For this room of mine, as I behold it in the glass, is the same, and yet not the same. It is not the mere representation of the room I live in, but it looks just as if I were reading about it in a story I like. (...) The mirror has lifted it out of the region of fact into the realm of art. (MacDonald, *Phantastes*, 98)

MacDonald's description of the fascinating features of the mirror, features which make it a symbol of the re-creative acts of writing and imagining, is particularly significant in relation to the perspective I adopt in this article. I explore here the mirror-related mechanisms represented and implied in the *Alice* books, and invoke the conceptual metaphor of the mirror to explain and illuminate some of their narrative aspects. The *fil rouge* consists of the various symbolic implications of the concept of the mirror, as related to the mind and the image of the mind. The powerful symbol of the mirror features in the *Alices* in a number of different ways, including the books' narrative construction, their overarching metaphors, and the kinds of mental reaction they stimulate in their readers. I explore the complex interconnection between reading and re-imagining using the mirror metaphor in the way MacDonald's quote suggests. Carroll's own obsession with mirrors and reversals offers a point of departure from which to develop the conceptual ramifications of the mirror motif, among which are the *mise en abyme*, the cognitive significance of duplication-related processes, mirror neurons, Theory of Mind (ToM), and meta-representational capabilities.

1) “The More Head-Downwards I Am, the More I Keep Inventing New Things”: Magic Mirrors and Lewis Carroll

In this section I want to foreground some peculiar uses Carroll made of mirror-related narrative devices, as well as the high degree of symbolic importance he attached to mirror figures in his construction of the *Alice* books. The section follows an expanding theoretical path, starting with Carroll’s first introduction of the conceptual function of the mirror, i.e. his use of the *mise en abyme* in *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, and then going on to show the pervading role it has in relation to Carroll’s nonsense writing from a broader perspective.

Carroll’s interest in mirrors should be situated in the cultural context of the Victorian Age, that critic Isobel Armstrong defines as “a glass culture” (see *Victorian Glassworlds: Glass Culture and the Imagination 1830-1880*) and which was characterised by the exploitation of mirror and glass-related motifs in all the diverse fields of culture, with the glass fountain in the Crystal Palace epitomizing this pervasive importance. Armstrong gives a compelling list of cultural elements influenced by this “many-faceted poetics of glass” (16), ranging from the new enthusiasm in the study of optical instruments to the proliferation of glass and crystal objects, decorated mirrors, chandeliers... it is art though the area where the semantic of glass expresses all its complexity. Pre-Raphaelite painters obsessively depict reflecting surfaces, women in front of mirrors, liquid and glassy images; and in Victorian literature (especially Victorian fairy-tales) all the cognitive, philosophical and existential symbolism connected to glass surfaces and mirrors is repeatedly represented and investigated. Carroll’s peculiar perspective on mirrors can be analysed following different theoretical ramifications: hence, the re-interpretation of fairy tales’ typical motifs, the extensive use of *mise en abyme* to highlight specific meanings, the connection between mirrors and revealing powers (in different senses: spiritual, psychological, satirical...), are all topics which Carroll explores in the *Alices*. Mirrors are “crystal labyrinths” (Armstrong, 151) in Carroll’s novels, a powerful medium through which he gives his readers a kaleidoscope of conceptual extensions.

A theoretical notion I am recurrently relying upon throughout the article is the above-mentioned *mise en abyme*. *Mise en abyme* is an artistic technique used in both literature and painting, which exemplifies the revealing power of mirror-related devices, since it functions within an

artwork as a mirror reflecting and explaining in some way the artwork itself. As Dällenbach puts it “est mise en abyme tout miroir interne réfléchissant l'ensemble du récit par réduplication.” (48).¹ The mirroring effect of the *mise en abyme* can expand the meaning and conceptual apparatus of the story in which it is inserted, enabling it to “rendre l'invisible visible” (Dällenbach, 100). Following McHale's statement that *mise en abyme* has “cognitive potential” (178), I would like to show how the specular mechanism used by Carroll enriches the reader's cognitive grasp of the story.

I begin this section with the topic of mirrors in fairy tales, especially in Victorian ones, and introduce Carroll's own special interest in inversions and duplications. I then show how Carroll makes use of the *mise en abyme* technique in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and explain its specific cognitive importance. I go on to trace the evolution of mirror concepts and experiences in Carroll's narrative worlds, the ultimate realisation of which is the construction of the Looking-Glass land in the second of the *Alice* book. Here the *mise en abyme* first explored in *Alice in Wonderland* becomes a pervasive narrative element; I elaborate upon the special features of the Looking-Glass world's architecture and the cognitive meaning behind them.

Throughout his life Charles Dodgson was “obsessed with inversions and reversals in words, mirrors, mirrors-writing, photography, logic, and life itself” (Rackin, *Nonsense, Sense*, 73). It has been already recognised how his interest in reversals and mirrors play a significant part in his life (see Fisher, 16-17; Douglas-Fairhurst, 186-87; Gardner, 149). Eco in his *Sugli Specchi ed altri Saggi* enumerates a number of possible mirror constructions, or *catoptric theatres*, in which mirrors are used to create illusory effects. Mirrors that multiply themselves and alter virtual images of objects, curved mirrors, plane mirrors superimposed, inclined mirrors, deforming mirrors: in all these cases mirrors function revealingly as signs. They are emblems of artistic creation, in the sense that, as artworks do, they take one's mind beyond a direct link with the referent and establish the possibility of amplifying the content (Eco, 27). This is also what Carroll's mirrors do; they continuously display an additional meaning, disclosing what someone *really* is, or what he or she *could* be. Art is the instrument *par excellence* for

¹ “Mise en abyme is every internal mirror reflecting by means of duplication the whole of the story”.

creating possible realities or alternative, amplified, distorted visions of actual reality. In other words, art is a maker of mirrors; it is accordingly a means to manifest hidden truths and to reveal identities. In this sense, the mirror is set up as a threshold phenomenon, which “marca i confini tra immaginario e simbolico (Eco, 10).”² The mirror is also a problematic tool that shows and hides changes. The reflection is identical to what it mirrors, but at the same time is different, exemplifying in this way the paradox of identity: the fact that it often consists in multiple possible coexistent identities, as what Cappelletto calls “una nozione caleidoscopica dell’identità (135).”³

In a similar way, in fairy tales and myths mirrors often have a magical and revealing function: they show the true nature of the person that they mirror, or they distort it, or they show something different. The mirror has a semiotic function, the specular image always producing a revelation: Narcissus discovers in a reflection the sterile reflexivity of an impossible love withdrawn into self-obsession; the queen of *Snow White* sees in her mirror the beauty of someone else, awakening her own negative side, consumed by anger and envy; the mirror in *The Beauty and the Beast* can show distant and beloved realities, inaccessible in the present moment; in Andersen’s *The Snow Queen* the mirror shatters and in doing so also fractures and distorts the identity of the mirrored one; while Cinderella’s meaningful glass slipper is nothing but a mirror transformed into a fashionable item. “All mirrors are magic mirrors” (73), writes MacDonald in *Phantastes* (published just a few years before *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*), a book in which “the centrality of the mirror is an intellectual and a material structural component” (Soto, 4).⁴

² Which “marks the boundaries between the imaginary world and the symbolic one.” Eco is here referring to the Lacanian distinction between imaginary and symbolic, where the imaginary mastery of one’s mirrored image is preliminary to the symbolic stage, where the recognition develops into linguistic expression (see also “The Mirror Stage”, “Jacques Lacan” in *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*). I’m quoting this particular sentence in order to show how the mirror works as a means of constructing one’s identity, highlighting its powerful role in the formation and understanding of the self.

³ “A kaleidoscopic notion of identity.”

⁴ Carroll owned a first edition version of *Phantastes* (Lovett, 200), and Shaberman lists several passages where it is possible to find influences from *Phantastes* in the *Alice* books (“George MacDonald and Lewis Carroll”, 17-18).

A more historically situated context, however, would be the prominence of mirrors and glass in Victorian culture, a presence so significant that it leads Armstrong to claim that the Victorian Age was characterised by “a dazzling semantics of glass” (1). Armstrong in her *Victorian Glassworlds* explores in detail how glass symbolically and practically holds together different aspects of Victorian culture, one she sees as permeated by “the poetics of transparency” (1). In this sense, Victorian glass can in fact be re-interpreted as being in significant relation to the fantastic and to fairy tales. Victorian interest in fairy tales was extensively mediated by glass-related elements such as magic mirrors, conservatories, newly invented optical lenses and related visual tools (magic lanterns, telescopes, kaleidoscopes, spectroscopes); and infused by the substance of glass itself, characterized by its metamorphic essence. If, as Armstrong points out, the different Victorian adaptations of *Cinderella* produced “a mythography of glass and its transformations” that explores the boundaries “between animate life and human being and human beings and things” (204), other fantastical narratives of the time also elaborated on the poetics of glass, as a symbolic technology, in between science and fairy tale. Apart from the already mentioned magical mirror he invokes in *Phantastes*, MacDonald uses a mirror in *Lilith* to symbolize access to the mystical timeless dimension of the afterlife. Tennyson explores the mysterious power of refraction and reflection in *The Lady of Shallot*, as does Christina Rossetti’s *Passing and Glassing*; Prince Dolor in Dinah Mulock Craik’s *The Little Lame Prince* uses magic magnifying glasses to watch the world around him; the glacier described by Ruskin in *The King of the Golden River* has the mysterious quality of a hybrid substance, partly ice, partly mirror, partly human-like creature; in Lucy Clifford’s dark story *The New Mother* it is the breaking of a looking-glass which causes tragic consequences (while the evil new mother is depicted as having glass eyes); and Kingsley’s *The Water Babies*, as Douglas-Fairhurst remarks, “had entertained readers with an aquatic version of the same [mirror-related] fantasy” (186).

Lewis Carroll thus inserts himself in a rich literary tradition of fairy tales and stories populated by magical mirrors, and was sensitive to the intuition that “a mirror resembled a story in other ways: both offered the viewer a neatly framed simulacrum of life; both flattened reality into two dimensions while giving the illusion of depth” (Douglas-Fairhurst, 186). However, Carroll’s contribution to the interlaced mythology of mirrors

and stories represents a particularly complex interpretation of both the traditional fairy tale component and the specifically Victorian cultural device. He offers an original and deep exploration of the intriguing possibilities that mirrors offer for fairy tales, as well as for philosophical meditations and existentialist questioning, and merges these different approaches in a rich and inspiring elaboration of the different symbolic implications suggested by the mirror as figure. In this sense, his *Alice* books constantly play with the idea of duplication and reflection, showing the numberless possible ramifications of meaning that these processes entail, and highlighting their cognitive potentialities.

Carroll was playing with logical contradictions and inversions already in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (Gardner, 148-49), but it is with *Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There* that the mirror-theme becomes pervasive. Before exploring the multiple, sometimes conflicting, meanings the Looking-Glass Land has for Carroll, however, I would like to examine a mirror-related narrative technique Carroll exploits in both the *Alice* books, the so-called *mise en abyme*.⁵

Carroll puts several short stories inside the two main *Alice* stories, and these short narratives work as little mirrors of the main narrations. Due to the nonsensical tissue of the *Alice* books, however, the *mise en abyme* also has a more elaborate and intricate role. I shall consider the Dormouse's story in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* as a prominent example. This short narration is about three little sisters, who live in a treacle-well, eat only treacle and spend their time drawing things which begin with the letter "M", "such as mouse-traps, and the moon and memory and muchness" (80). The three little sisters are obviously the Liddell sisters: their names, says the Dormouse, are "Elsie, Lacie, and Tillie" (78), where Elsie is Lorina Charlotte, Lacie is an anagram of Alice, and Tillie refers to Edith's nickname Matilda (M. Gardner, 80). At a first glance the Dormouse's story seems as nonsensical as its surroundings, without any specific relation to them, and the reference to "muchness" as "any sort of all-pervading sameness in a situation" (M. Gardner, 82) doesn't appear to apply to the things the Dormouse is listing. Nevertheless, it is precisely their

⁵ Carroll's *mise en abymes* do not meet the specifications of a "purist criterion" (McHale, 176), but they do accord with the "middling definition" he proposes: they maintain a demonstrable relation with the overall story within which they are inserted, and they are ontologically subordinate to the primary world of the story (176-7).

“muchness” that is the key to the *mise en abyme* role of the story. Looking more closely at the things the little sisters (themselves a mirror of the three Liddells) are drawing inside the treacle-well, it is possible to link each of them with Alice’s experiences in Wonderland. Thus “mouse-traps” refer to Alice’s first encounter in Wonderland, with the Mouse, and her constant latent predatory attitude towards it (26-28); “the moon” (which is a general figure for the nonsense genre⁶) evokes the Cheshire Cat’s grin and its vanishing like “the waning of the moon” (M. Gardner, 63); “memory” is the most problematic mental faculty in Wonderland, emphasised by Alice’s persistent forgetfulness (she doesn’t remember how to speak good English, she can’t recall the poems she used to know by heart, and she forgets even her own name and identity). In this sense the three sisters are drawing three main themes of the book, all related to specific features of the mind: latent aggression, lunacy, and loss of memory and identity. The *mise en abyme* therefore highlights key topics of the book, serving as a cognitive cue to the narrative’s larger meanings.

Additionally, Elsie, Lacie and Tillie live in a treacle-well, and precisely at the bottom of it, which recalls Alice’s fall into a deep hole and her finding, during her fall, orange marmalade on the hole’s shelves. Treacle and marmalade are sweet and delicious, but here they are associated with a deep and dark well or hole. Wonderland is a place marked by ambivalence, by the first promise of marvellous and pleasant experiences (“the loveliest garden,” 16) and the subsequent revelation of madness and confusion (“we’re all mad here,” 68). The fact that the sisters in the Dormouse’s story are drawing things which represent the experience of Wonderland using treacle, is itself another reflexive mechanism, a duplication inside a duplication. The story is a *mise en abyme*, and within it the treacle-drawing act of the three sisters is a further *mise en abyme*.

This single example illustrates in detail the practical use Carroll makes of mirror-related narrative techniques in his *Alice* books, but there are a lot of other possible illustrative cases, including all the parodies Alice and the other characters recite, which are microcosms of the prevailing mocking perspective of the overall narration. The concept of parody itself can be interpreted as a mirror-related form: parodies give us back a modified version of their targets, working as distorting mirrors. Even when the poems or songs are not created by Carroll as explicit parodies,

⁶ As Gardner remarks, the moon “has long been associated with lunacy” (63).

they typically contain elements which function as mirrors of the general sense, structure and atmosphere of the stories: see for instance the White Knight's song, 256-259; or the *Jabberwocky* itself, 155-156, which in fact has to be held in front of a mirror to be read.

The *Jabberwocky* is a remarkable and significant example, which incorporates several of the peculiar aspects of the Looking-Glass land. *Jabberwocky* is written in mirror-writing; it is a parody of ancient poetry (it presents itself as "a quasi-heroic narrative poem in which, as in *Beowulf*, a fabulous monster is slain," Haughton, 329); it fragments and deconstructs language and meanings; and, in Tenniel's drawing,⁷ it depicts a reversal of the Pre-Raphaelite motif of the knight killing a dangerous dragon, putting little Alice⁸ in the place of the armoured knight. Hence, *Jabberwocky* functions as another *mise en abyme*, incorporating features of the whole of *Through the Looking-Glass*: reverse logic, linguistic and semantic deconstruction, parodist attitude, nostalgic outlook towards ancient forms of narration. In conclusion, as these examples emphasise, the *mise en abyme* in the nonsense narrative context of the *Alices* not only has the cognitive function of aiding comprehension of the framing texts, but also contributes further to their complexity and to their multiplication and reshaping of perspectives.

It is with the second of the *Alice* books that the mirror topic becomes more and more explicit, being the essence of the story itself, and of its represented world. The *mise en abyme* here is no longer simply a narrative technique, but instead is embedded in the content of the whole story, in which everything exists as a duplication with a surplus of meaning. The frequent use of the *mise en abyme* in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* introduced Carroll's exploitation of mirror-related techniques of narration; here, in the Looking-Glass land, mirror motifs provide the essential structure of the entire narration. To recapitulate the major topics briefly: Alice goes through a looking-glass, and this physical and symbolic act marks the beginning of her adventure. The world she finds on the other side is located on a huge chessboard, itself a configuration marked by a

⁷ A drawing that Carroll, significantly, at first wanted to be the frontispiece of the book, although he subsequently changed his mind, worried that the image could be frightening for young children (Haughton, 333).

⁸ Even though in the poem Carroll mentions a "beamish boy" as the hero fighting the Jabberwocky, in the illustration Tenniel depicts a young person who looks a lot like Alice (see Haughton, 333).

contrast of opposites, foreshadowed by the black and the white kittens of the opening scene. It is a world where everything is back to front and upside down: Alice has to run to remain still in the same place, she has to walk in the opposite direction to where she intends to go, she quenches her thirst with dry biscuits, she discovers that looking-glass cakes have to be handed round first and then cut, and that memory there refers to future events. The mirror structure works at many different narrative levels, from the architectural aspects of the fictional world to the writing methods used to construct it, from the philosophical reflections the story provokes to the personal psychological connotations it had for Carroll himself.

Philosophical considerations related to the figure of the mirror are pervasive in *Through the Looking-Glass*. Jonathan Holt mentions Baudrillard's concept of simulacra as a possible analogue for the deconstruction, reconstruction and alteration of reality (leading to the creation of a "hyperreality") realised in the Carrollian world on the other side of the mirror ("Deconstructing the Mirror"). Alice has to navigate this new dimension, which presents her with different ways of thinking, new possibilities for perceiving and conceptualising space and time, altered languages, and nameless identities.

In the Looking Glass World, the logic of knowledge, of identity, of language, and of reason are broken down to their most basic parts and projected into a construct that is at once the same as and different than our own reality. By the time she wakes from her nap in front of the fire, Alice has been forced to hold every aspect of herself up before a mirror, and learned to question everything. (Holt)

The conceivability of unnatural worlds is another aspect of Alice's encounter with the Looking-Glass land, where even the categories of the possible and impossible experience a reversal. A further philosophical nuance of the world on the other side of the mirror has been teased out by Ackerman in *Behind the Looking-Glass*, which emphasises the mystical qualities attributed to the mirror in Neoplatonist, Theosophical and spiritualist beliefs, all currents of mystical thought in which Carroll was interested. Going through the mirror, according to this perspective, means leaving material illusions behind and gaining access to the knowledge of Forms (Ackerman, 23-24). Alice's journey through the looking-glass thus acquires additional meaning as a symbolic mental

pilgrimage through the privileged means of dreaming, in order to explore the mysteries of interiority, of moods and motives, inner conflicts and contradictions, memories and dreams, to bring the unconscious into consciousness, to experience extreme and ineffable states of consciousness, and to know the infinite. (Ackerman, 33)

Another quality of the land Alice finds through the mirror has more existential features, as well as stylistic reverberations. Embedded in the narrative world of the second *Alice* book there is a nostalgia for a lost past, articulated in different, and even self-contradictory ways. On the one hand, in the Looking-Glass world, “things go the other way,” everything seems to be going backwards. “*Looking-Glass* is haunted by the past,” with its stylistic reminiscences of “Spenserean romance and German fairy tales” (Houghton, xlvi), along with the presence of Medieval characters and creatures from nursery-rhymes, and explicit moments of almost lyrical melancholy. Equally directed towards the past is the essential idea upon which the book is founded, that of making Alice, who by that time was nineteen, into a seven-year-old child again, in order to go back to the summery golden days of childhood and Wonderland. On the other hand, the reversal also reverses itself: in the world where things go back, Alice manages to go ahead. She proceeds across the chessboard, following her goal of becoming a queen, although in the end, as before in the lovely garden in Wonderland, it turns out to be a dissatisfying and absurd experience. While Carroll tries to defeat the cold winter days of the other side of the Looking-Glass (where Alice sees “the snow against the windowpanes,” 146) by recreating the first Alice, moving through a summery land of wonders, in the event his story rebels against itself. As Robert Douglas-Fairhurst concludes,

It is as if Carroll needed to include a private story within the public one, even if the sight of Alice leaving these bumbling and grumbling figures behind was a way of tapping one of the most common plots in the world. Children grow up. They move on. (193)

Therefore, the mirror-like architecture of the second *Alice* book permeates the conceptual tissue of the story at different levels, philosophical, existentialist, and psychological, and also offers a meta-

reflection on the essence of narrative itself. The story is a dream, as was Wonderland, but with a difference: in Wonderland the dream was Alice's, and afterwards became Alice's sister's, suggesting the idea of a continuity of re-dreaming and re-telling. In the Looking-Glass land the dreamer of the dream is not known for sure and the idea of an interconnection of two dreams is introduced. Tweedledum and Tweedledee point out to Alice that she's just "a sort of thing" in the Red King's dream (198), while Alice is dreaming her adventures in the looking-glass, dreaming of herself and of the Red King dreaming about her. I've quoted already (Chapter 2, 86) what Martin Gardner says about this passage: "an odd sort of infinite regress is involved here in the parallel dreams of Alice and the Red King. Alice dreams of the King, who is dreaming of Alice, who is dreaming of the King, and so on, like two mirrors facing each other" (198).

What I would like to add here is that the metaphor of the mirror and its pervasive presence in the book, is a particularly useful conception of this recursive process, established not only between the fictional world and character's minds, but also with respect to the reader's mind. Alice jumps through the mirror and finds a parallel world that functions as a revelation and a parodic mirror of the "real" one, while this framework mirrors readers' immersion in the book itself, and the revealing mirror it holds up to their own world and its complexities. The double dream logic running through the story shows how the creative process is entangled with the re-creative process of reading, and at the same time mirrors the relationship between the author and his main character.

2) "Which Do *You* Think It Was?": On the Other Side of the Book

In this section I address the concept of the mirror as connected with mirror neurons and mind-reading skills. The metaphor of the mirror is particularly useful to describe the way we deal with literary texts. However, this metaphor is not taken here as signifying a passive mirroring, but rather an active reflection, where the reflection is not possible without the minds which reflect it, and, in reflecting, in part create. This metaphor is illustrated by the move Alice makes in *Through the Looking-Glass*; by jumping through the mirror, she takes an active role in creating the mirrored reality. Such a conceptual perspective orients this section, from the way I propose to utilise the notion of mirror neurons in narrative

studies, to the way I depict the reader's interaction with the text. I introduce mirror-neurons and related theories with the necessary caveats that literary theorists should keep in mind, whilst emphasizing the usefulness that a metaphorical meaning of this notion can have for the field of narratology. Then I develop this conceptual approach by applying it to the *Alices* in progressively more complex ways: I start by showing the different ways in which readers reflect the minds they encounter in the *Alice* books, and their own experience of these minds, using their Theory of Mind capabilities; and I conclude by describing the peculiar ways in which the *Alice* books deconstruct the mirror-illusion of many of our representations, revealing their origin as meta-representations (which are representations of other people's representations)⁹.

I would like here to introduce the problematic topic of mirror neurons, and to clarify my theoretical perspective in relation to it. In alignment with the other sections of this article, the concept of mirror is used in mainly a *metaphorical* way. Mirror neurons have a real, scientific existence, but the scientific evidence about them is still discussed and controversial, and the possible use of this discovery in narrative contexts is even more debatable, as Marie-Laure Ryan points out in her article "Narratology and Cognitive Science: A Problematic Relation."

Mirror neurons are neurons which are activated when we just witness someone performing an action, without the need of any personal practical involvement. They are in this sense significantly interrelated with the conceptual scenarios of virtuality, imitation, empathy, mind-reading, imagination. If neuroscientists like Ramachandran (see *Phantoms in the Brain* and *The Emerging Mind*) and Gallese and Goldman ("Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind Reading") and Gallese and Sinigaglia (*So Quel che Fai: Il Cervello che Agisce e I Neuroni Specchio*) have highlighted the possible implications of this neurological finding for the understanding of the behavioural processes of imitation and mind-reading, narrative theorists like Luca Berta have made a further step linking the work of mirror neurons with the mental construction of virtual realities (428).

Nevertheless, cognitive concepts like mirror neurons shouldn't be appropriated to the field of narratology without theoretical precautions and without the introduction of a conceptual metaphorical level. Ryan's

⁹ About the role of meta-representations in reading other people's minds and in reading fictional minds see Zunshine, 47-118.

“Narratology and Cognitive Science: A Problematic Relation” can help to clarify some points. She observes that the discoveries of cognitive science, such as mirror neurons, have so far just “verified commonsensical ideas,” since for narratologists interested in possible worlds the relevance of notions such as virtual reality, or the creation of mental models based on the storyworld’s instructions, is “self-evident” (2). Ryan distinguishes between two approaches cognitive narratology can take, one related to the theoretical dialogue with neurological research (what she calls the “hard cognitive science,” 3), and the other connected to the more speculative branches of cognitive studies, such as philosophy of mind. She dismisses the first approach because the scientific methods of neurological research, such as brain scans, are not yet sophisticated enough to give really interesting insights from a narratological perspective; and while she distinguishes two methods related to the second one, a top-down approach and a convergence method (4-6), she considers both of them to lack a consistent and valid methodology. Ryan argues that for cognitive narratology to be a significant discipline it must wait for scientific methods to progress and give narratology a “genuine feedback loop” of its ideas; in the meantime, narratologists should develop a set of “right questions” for an understanding of “the nexus of narrative and mind” (10).

Embracing Ryan’s perspective, I agree that there clearly has been too much theoretical enthusiasm for mirror neurons or other “hard” cognitive science concepts, while the “soft” cognitive science-related approach has lacked systematicity. However, scientific findings such as mirror neurons can still be conceptually interesting from a narrative view point, if approached cautiously: they can still give substance and a new source of inspiration to narratological research, providing an interdisciplinary link. The lack of a rigorous method and of tangible results in the second type of approach certainly needs to be addressed, but many interesting theoretical suggestions have been made (as Ryan herself acknowledges, mentioning the works of Suzanne Keen and Herman, for instance), and these suggestions can also be correlated to the set of questions Ryan suggests, waiting for further advancements in practical research.

In my theoretical position, I would like to adopt the “soft” approach, but in a more metaphorical sense. The use of cognitive science concepts like mirror neurons can inspire several types of narrative reflection, dealing with topics from the construction of storyworlds to the interactions among characters themselves. However, such reflections concern our

ideas and theories about the working of the human mind, not a methodical scientific empiricism about it – what a narratological outlook can do is to offer reflections upon *how we think* about the mind and its intricacies. Using again the mirror metaphor, cognitive narratology can reflect upon reflection about the human mind, through the interaction between cognitive science concepts and narrative scenarios. It can offer insights, speculations, and even questions (as Ryan highlights) about how the human mind constructs the human mind itself.

With these caveats in mind, I would like now to proceed to show how, from a metaphorical perspective, concepts such as mirror neurons and the related ideas of Theory of Mind (ToM) and meta-representational skills can be useful in understanding of readers' experiences with the *Alice* books. Regarding mirror neurons, Richard Walsh stresses that, while many narratologists tend "to understand the metaphor in terms of the virtual image in the mirror (...) the metaphor was originally used to characterise the *action* of these neurons" ("The Fictive Reflex," 10). In this sense, the focus of the metaphor as adopted in narratological contexts would shift from the written representation to the reflective representational act of the part of readers: "a reflection, indeed, is *not* a representation in the artefactual sense in which that term is commonly understood, but the effect of a situated process of observation; there is no image in the mirror independent of the act of viewing it" (10).

Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There may work as an exemplification of this way of conceptualising mirror neurons: the reality of the Looking-Glass land, with all its revealing cognitive meanings related to processes of duplication and inversion, is not a mere visual reflection. Alice *goes* through the mirror, the idea of action that the exploration of the mirrored reality entails is made clear already in the title, with its emphasis upon "through" and the action verb attributed to Alice. The metaphor of the mirror proposed by the second of the *Alice* books thus conveys both the idea that mirror mechanisms are revealing and powerful and the fact that these mechanisms are deeply entangled with actual interpretative action. Alice's jump through the mirror and her active interaction with the Looking-Glass world is what makes it possible for that world to project any meaning at all. Alice's going through the "bright silvery mist" (149) of the mirror can symbolize readers' interplay with the textual reality, which doesn't exist without their interpretative acts.

The concept of Theory of Mind (ToM) is used to describe our cognitive ability to attribute to other people thoughts, beliefs, desires (see Zunshine, 6-10) and it is strictly related to the concept of meta-representational skills. I would like here to focus on the specific implications these concepts may have in relation to the *Alice* books as reading experiences. The mirror metaphor of Alice jumping through the Looking-Glass is a conceptual framework for readers' experiences with the text, functioning as another kind of *mise en abyme*, an interpretative one this time, metaphorically picturing how readers approach the narrative.

There are several levels on which readers' ToM-related skills are challenged and on which they are reflecting¹⁰ the minds they encounter in Carroll's stories. First, it is worth considering readers' alignment with Alice's mind. The characters Alice meets in the bizarre worlds of her two dreams are completely inaccessible and opaque, and their actions illogical and incomprehensible: Alice's ToM-related capabilities prove to be totally useless there, and the same happens for readers, since they share Alice's perspective. Readers directly follow her thoughts, questioning and doubts, because "The sole medium of the stories is her pellucid consciousness" (De La Mare, 55). If Carroll has identified with his heroine, he has also managed to make his readers do the same: Alice's mind, and the products of her dreaming mind, constitute the pervasive point of view of the stories.

Secondly, Alice's mind can become itself the object of readers' reflections. On the one hand, the Wonderland and Looking-Glass land creatures' minds have been created by Carroll in a non-mimetic way that leaves us, like Alice, in a constant state of mental puzzlement (the applicability of real-minds discourse on them not being a viable option). On the other hand, readers' identification with Alice's perspective means that we are looking at the world with a child's mind. Jenny Karlsson mentions that Alice's cognitive abilities are not as developed as an adult's: in particular, at the age of seven she doesn't have a fully developed capacity for hypothetical thinking, and "the lack of advanced hypothetical thinking affects the child's ability to view something from the perspective of others" (4). This might itself be the reason why Alice constantly fails to understand the characters she encounters. Therefore, readers may identify two different reasons for their difficulty in grasping what is happening in

¹⁰ "Reflection" intended here in the active way outlined above, with readers' minds matching Alice's dynamic interaction with the mirrored world.

the minds of the Carrollian creatures. Maybe we are facing the depiction of unnatural and unpredictable minds, or maybe we are constrained by a little girl's mind, and presented only with her own mental scenario. In this way Alice's mental frame becomes an object of reflection and doubt: in other words, is the Alice who encounters these creatures a reliable focalizer? We are able to question Alice's reliability since our relation to her viewpoint is not one of complete and blind alignment: the internal focalization presupposes a conceptual distinction between the character Alice and the dreaming Alice. It makes us follow her frame of reference, but at the same time we still retain a kind of detachment, which allows us to doubt her, or the extent to which she knows her own mind, and so to make her an object of our attention.

Thirdly, our own correspondence with Alice itself becomes the object of our mental focus, when we are forced to step back from her perspective. There are two moments in which the narration explicitly makes readers disentangle from Alice's way of looking at the world around her: the two endings of the books. In *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* our standpoint shifts from Alice to her sister, and the dream begins again: a dream about Alice and the strange creatures of her Wonderland dream. At first our detachment from Alice's viewpoint is just illusory: her sister's perspective is immediately reabsorbed by the strength of Alice's dream, as an inescapable frame of reference. Then, in the last paragraph of the text, the vision of Alice's sister acquires the tones of the book's prefatory poem: dreaming, melancholy, making the whole text shimmer away as an only half-remembered mirage. The almost romantic tones of the conclusion are in total contrast with the atmosphere that Alice's dream has just conveyed: readers' object of attention shifts to Alice's sister's dream and viewpoint, prompting them to pay attention to their own alignment with the characters' perspectives, and consequently question *both* sisters' dreams.

The second book's conclusion is different but not less puzzling: Alice comes back to the initial scenario, the living room and her cats' company, but this time she doesn't dismiss the "curious dream" in a melancholy absent-minded repetition of it (both in her own actions, hurrying to tea-time like the Mad Hatter and the March Hare, and in her sister's mind); instead she rationally questions it, trying first to figure out the roles her kittens play in it, and then posing a metaphysical question about the essence of dreaming itself. The shifting of perspective comes more abruptly this time, with a sudden and unexpected question to the readers

themselves “which do *you* think it was?” with the “you” marked by the use of italics. We suddenly lose our mental identification with Alice, and the brusque change to the second person makes us all at once clearly aware of this previous identification, and of the fact that there’s *someone else* there, apart from Alice. Throughout the whole story we read (or actually don’t read) other minds, and interpret situations, only through Alice’s eyes, not always noticing it; but at the end Carroll troubles this almost unconscious mental attitude with that abrupt question. The author’s presence is suddenly made more prominent, and we are also led to question our own identity as readers. What does it mean to be “you”? Who are we supposed to be? Having read through the chapters of *Through the Looking-Glass* trapped in “a dream of a pawn’s-eye view of a looking-glass game of chess” (Houghton, 325), we finally realise it was “only” the main character’s dream; and then we are induced to consider whether this dream might be contained within another dream, and even that our own reading perspective might be included. In addition, Alice is talking to her kittens while questioning the nature of her own, or someone else’s, dream, and pointing out that, firstly, the cats themselves were an important part of the dream; secondly, in the dream there was a strange recurrence of fishy references. Another question might be: are the readers supposed to be *cats*? Have we just been led unconsciously into a cat-perspective, continuously oriented towards food, and fish in particular, and not at all interested in mind-reading? Our ToM-related capabilities having been repeatedly challenged in our active interaction with the mirror of the text, “we are left with a feeling of a mental vertigo” (Zunshine, 104).

The *Alice* books also challenge readers’ source-monitoring mental devices (see Zunshine, 60-65) through the continuous failure of the heroine’s (and readers’) meta-representations of reality. Meta-representational capabilities are closely linked to ToM-related skills: they are those mental tools that allow us to discern the sources of opinions, sentences, thoughts. The representations that Alice has internalized about other people’s thoughts, beliefs and habits have come to form her version of how the world should be. In Wonderland, Carroll makes her and his readers (again, our mental expectations are entangled with hers, as above) begin to understand how many representations of the reality around us are in fact meta-representations, only we have forgotten the “source tag” (Zunshine, 50). In other words, many meta-representations have actually become “semantic memories,” which are “representations that are stored

without the source tag” (Zunshine, 51); but we can nonetheless come to recognize them once again as meta-representations.¹¹ The mirror metaphor in this case emphasizes the instability of meta-representations: when we forget their “meta-” status we unthinkingly assume that our thoughts are mirroring the world around us, when we’re actually dealing with how *other minds* have mirrored it. In the Looking-Glass world the exposure of such errors is especially pervasive, as the mirror element in the narrative functions to turn the world back to front, highlighting the relativity of our world-image representations.

In *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, Alice decides to follow the White Rabbit because he is a curious and funny creature, with unexpected attitudes; we anticipate he will be a nice little speaking pet – what else can a little cute white bunny be? – so, when Alice actually talks to him, we are quite disconcerted to discover that with the powerful he is “nervously shilly-shallying” and “feeble” (Carroll, “*Alice on the Stage*”), but he is irascible and angry with lower status characters – including Alice, whom he takes for his housemaid. Indeed, the confrontation with the White Rabbit is a disappointing one for Alice, marking from the beginning the disillusioning nature of her discoveries in Wonderland. Similarly, she drinks potions in order to enter the little door into Wonderland because she thinks it is “the loveliest garden you ever saw” and “she longed to get out of that dark hall and wander about among those beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains” (16). But this wonderful and enchanted place, at which she will arrive only after countless vicissitudes, finally reveals itself to be the triumph of absurdity, the culmination of all the nonsense we have encountered along with her on her complex journey.

In the course of this journey all her Victorian constructions of the world, her meta-representations, are questioned. The Duchess is represented as anything but a typical Duchess, or what a Duchess is generally *supposed to be*: she is “*very ugly*”, she is very rude, and, moreover, nurses a horrible child by tossing him violently up and down, and singing him this lullaby: “I speak severely to my boy, / I beat him when he sneezes; / For he can thoroughly enjoy / The pepper when he pleases!” (64). Meanwhile the cook contaminates the air with pepper, and throws dishes,

¹¹ Zunshine gives as an example the past belief that the Earth was at the centre of the universe, which had acquired the status of semantic memory, as incontrovertible knowledge; subsequently, however, it became a meta-representation with the source tag “people used to think that” ... (51).

pots and plates at everyone. The cosy idea of a serene and decorous Victorian interior is overturned by this disturbing picture. Carroll reveals the unstable essence of social constructions, taking what is normally *represented* by the social-constructed mind as sublime and noble, and showing its hidden impulses of violence and selfishness. Meta-representations, it seems, are *not* reliable mirrors of an objective reality. The Duchess's baby begins to grunt as Alice nurses it, and quickly turns into a pig; Alice takes note of the fact, reflecting that she would enjoy, like another Circe, turning other children she knows into pigs. The metamorphosis unveils the real nature of many children, so celebrated and exalted in Victorian songs and lullabies: "the pig-baby episode humorously dramatizes the arbitrary nature of conventional attitudes toward infants" (Rackin, *Nonsense, Sense*, 52). Alice humorously adapts herself to these puzzling new circumstances, and wisely concludes: "if it had grown up it would have made a dreadfully ugly child: but it makes rather a handsome pig, I think" (66).

On her Wonderland trip, Alice finds that familiar things are continually being transformed and parodied: cats, her favourite animals, have as their representative the "animale totemico del nonsense" (Scrittori, 45),¹² the king of paradoxes whose ineffable grin is the subversion of sense. The Cheshire Cat's smile twinkles alone like an erratic half-moon, in the sky of non-sense, persisting even when all the rest of the animal's body has disappeared, to Alice's perplexity: "I've often seen a cat without a grin, but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!" (69). The Cheshire Cat is the incarnation of non-sense, enacting the insubstantialities of language and logic: Rackin points out the supreme danger that the grin without the cat represents, by breaking "the seemingly indestructible bond between subject and attribute, a crucial element in the logic by which we live our rational lives" (*Nonsense, Sense*, 53). Alice's favourite pet becomes the embodiment of common logic's collapse, a perverse symbol of the arbitrariness of language and logic. Even tea-time, an occasion that Victorian readers in particular, and English readers in general, recognise as a cultural ritual, is transformed in Wonderland in an absurd event, in one of the best-known comic episodes of the book: the mad tea party. Here, in the setting of the usual Victorian ceremony of 6 o'clock tea, "practically all pattern save the consistency of chaos, is

¹² "The totemic animal of nonsense."

annihilated” by the absurd dialogues with the Mad Hatter and the March Hare (Rackin, *Nonsense, Sense*, 36).

After this encounter, Alice arrives at last in the lovely garden that had aroused her curiosity and desire from the beginning, sustaining her through the absurdity and non-sense of her progress towards it. Yet even this garden demolishes common ideas about enchanted fairy tale gardens: the wonderful garden with “bright flower-beds and cool fountains” is actually the Queen of Hearts' croquet-ground, where the roses are fake and where Alice experiences the definitive collapse of her mental categories. Representations are thus shown in Wonderland for what they often are: *meta*-representations (representations about others' representations, frequently fallacious), structures of the mind built up to deal with the world's confusion. In the Queen's croquet-ground even the basic distinction between animate beings and inanimate objects, something which Alice was sure she could rely upon as a solid objective truth, is under discussion: the subjects, the soldiers, the sovereigns, are cards (objects, in the “real” world), whereas flamingos and porcupines, living animals in normal usage, are treated here as inanimate objects (croquet bats and balls). In Wonderland Alice herself, whom we picture as a little girl, has already become a snake, a cruel animal, in the episode with the Pigeon, where “the golden child herself becomes the serpent in childhood's Eden” (Auerbach, “Alice and Wonderland”, 41); at the climax she discovers her alter-ego, the Queen of Hearts, who is no more than a playing card. What Rackin calls the destruction of Alice's self in Wonderland (*Nonsense, Sense*, 58) is also the destruction of our own representational categories.

We likewise discover that the objective world can be completely reversed in *Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There*, but in an even more decisive way (since here the act of turning everything back to front is the narrative cipher of the story). The reversals made possible by the mirror reveal that our representations do not simply mirror an objective world. The mirror itself is a means of inverting and modifying: a perfectly correspondent reflection does not exist. Common beliefs about reality turn out to be almost unconsciously acquired meta-representations, the sources of which (parents or social environments perhaps) are no longer identifiable; as Lisa Zunshine puts it, “although the distinction between semantic and episodic memories (or between representations and

meta-representations) is useful (...), this distinction is always context-dependent and potentially fluid” (52).

In *Through the Looking-Glass*, we find that things can go “the other way” from the one we are accustomed to. As in Alice’s previous adventures, the first place she sees and the one she longs to reach is a beautiful garden (including “a large flower-bed, with a border of daisies, and a willow-tree growing in the middle,” 166), but again it proves quite hard to get there. Basic conceptions of spatial reality are totally overturned: she walks straight ahead, towards the garden, and she finds herself at her point of departure, in the house. Alice is upset until, by trying to move in the *opposite* direction from the place she wants to reach, she actually finds herself moving *towards* it. However, the garden is another disappointment: the flowers can talk, but rather than being gentle and pleasant, as our mental associations tell us flowers should be, they prove very rude and annoying. They talk to and about Alice very impolitely, commenting that her face is “not a clever one,” that her petals (i.e., her hair) should be “curled up a little more,” that she “never thinks at all,” that she is fading, and, finally, from the Violet, “I never saw anybody that looked stupider” (166-169). Flowers, whose secret language was regarded as metaphorically resonant and poetical in Victorian times, speak here aggressively and impertinently; the picture of flowers as kind creatures is foregrounded as another meta-representation, in the product of a specific cultural context.

Going “forwards” in the Looking-glass World, we come to realise that the known world can be completely upended; what is considered as common knowledge turns out to be only *one* possible perspective. By crossing to the other side of the looking-glass, Alice discovers that growing-up is an illusion of happiness; that is, becoming a Queen, which is Alice’s goal from the beginning, turns out to be another disappointment. She finds herself with a golden crown, but trapped between two old silly creatures (the other two Queens) in a dimension of nonsensical riddles and chaos (where bottles become birds, candles turn into fireworks, the White Queen drowns in a soup and the Red one turns into a little doll). In general, normal convictions about how our world works are revealed to be meta-representations and thus apt to be relativized. On the other side of the mirror it is possible to stay still in the same place even while running at speed; thirst can be quenched by eating dry biscuits; Nobody turns out

often to be Somebody; proper names can have a meaning while common names can be meaningless; memory concerns expectations and projections of the future... In this sense, the *Alice* books show the fragility of our mental representations, helping us to question the world and its meanings, to reshape common notions and to challenge accepted beliefs. The mirror metaphor, which has helped already highlighting Carroll's own writing approach to nonsense, and the way the readers' minds *reflect* upon the text, finally reveals to be useful also in this demystification process and relativizing of perspective.

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The Hitch Hiker's Guide to Wonderland: Douglas Adams and Lewis Carroll

Sarah Stanfield

When the Hitch Hiker stories were first aired on Radio 4 in 1978 the Lewis Carroll Society was nine years old. Members' ears pricked up as the stories unfolded, was Douglas Adams borrowing from Lewis Carroll? Why was the answer to life, the universe and everything, 42? Why were episodes labelled in 'fits'? Why was the story a nonsense quest-less journey reminiscent of Wonderland? A member of the Committee duly contacted Douglas Adams to speak to the Society about these coincidences, but he declined.

On re-reading the Hitch Hiker novels (there are five by Douglas Adams) with a forensic eye, and after reading extensively about the author and researching his papers lodged at St John's College Cambridge, it is evident that Adams was heavily influenced by Carroll.

This paper will look at the man himself, the events that shaped his writing, the evidence of his borrowings from Carroll, followed by some discussion on whether he was guilty of plagiarism and whether that matters.

Douglas Noel Adams (the first DNA to come out of Cambridge as he liked to point out - was born on the 11th of March 1952 in Cambridge to his mother Janet - a nurse, and his father Christopher a Theologian. A few years later Douglas' sister Susan was born and the family moved to London, but in 1957 his parents divorced acrimoniously, and Douglas, his mother and sister moved to live with his grandmother who ran an animal welfare shelter in Brentwood, Essex.

Initially a mute child, Douglas proved to be eccentric, but gifted, and he passed the entrance examination for Brentwood School (an independent boarding school attended by other notables such as Robin Day, Jack Straw, Griff Rhys Jones and Noel Edmonds). By the age of 12 he was already 6 feet, eventually growing to 6 feet 5 inches tall. His teachers, when

needing to suggest a meeting place for the class didn't name a tree or building to muster around, but told the children to 'meet by Adams'.

He was already gifted at writing short stories and spoof reviews of school events for their magazine 'The Brentwoodian', and in 1965 (when he was 13) he had a letter and a short story published in 'The Eagle 'comic for boys. In 2014 the school discovered a poem in a cupboard by Douglas during his time there, entitled 'A Dissertation on the Task of Writing a Poem on a Candle and an Account of Some of the Difficulties Thereto Pertaining'.

He seemed set fair in pitching his obvious writing skills towards a degree in English Literature, and on the strength of an essay he wrote on religious poetry encompassing both the Beatles (with whom he was obsessed) and William Blake, he was awarded an exhibition at St John's College Cambridge, going up in 1971 when he was 19. His main aim in going to Cambridge was to join 'The Footlights', which is an invitation only theatre group, but he was not successful in being admitted for some time. Later, Simon Jones who played Arthur Dent, nominated him for entry into the elite company, which Douglas was to subsequently acknowledge by offering him the lead role in Hitch Hiker).

Undaunted, Douglas linked up with 29 two other like-minded would-be comic actors called Will Adams and Martin Smith, and they became 'Adams - Smith - Adams' and created their own reviews and comic sketches. When he took his place in 'The Footlights' in 1973 he admitted that comedy (greatly influenced by the Monty Python Team) took prime place during his time at Cambridge. He professed to only write 3 essays in 3 years, but did graduate in 1974 with a B.A. in English Literature.

After leaving Cambridge he returned to London with the aim of becoming a writer for TV or radio. He contributed to an edited version of the Footlights Review which was aired on BBC2 in 1974 and later transferred to the West End stage. Graham Chapman of Monty Python fame, was in the audience and sought Douglas out as a writing partner. Their liaison only lasted a year, but Douglas did write one Monty Python sketch for Episode 45 of the series, and he also wrote a sketch about Marilyn Monroe with Graham for the soundtrack album of 'Monty Python and the Holy Grail'. Douglas also made two brief appearances in Python sketches in 1974, and he went on to do some non-Python projects with Graham Chapman.

He was very excited to be working with his comedy heroes, but then his attempts to find paid work stalled, and he was forced to take any job to make ends meet. In turn he became a hospital porter, barn builder and chicken shed cleaner. He was also a bodyguard for the Qatari royal family, undoubtedly given the job due to his intimidating height rather than his fierce demeanor, but he kept writing sketches during this time, but with little success.

In 1976 he wrote and performed in 'Unpleasantness at Brodie's Close' at the Edinburgh Festival, but with nothing else in the pipeline he returned to live with his mother (now in Dorset and re-married with two more children), and his confidence plummeted and he became depressed. In 1977 he wrote sketches for the radio comedy series 'The Burkiss Way' and 'The News Huddlines' and with Graham Chapman he wrote an episode of 'Doctor on the Go', a sequel to 'Doctor in the House'.

He later wrote some episodes of 'Doctor Who' and with John Lloyd (of QI fame) he wrote 2 episodes of a children's programme called 'Doctor Snuggles'. In addition he worked as a radio producer working on 'Week Ending', and became a script editor for 'Doctor Who'.

Later in 1977 Douglas and the radio producer Simon Brett pitched the idea to Radio 4 of a comedy science fiction series. To their knowledge this had not been done before, although in America there was a comedy series called 'My Favourite Martian' and a sitcom called 'Mork and Mindy'. Woody Allen had also done the film 'Sleeper' in 1973, and there was John Carpenter's 'Dark Star'. In the UK David Croft and Jimmy Perry ('Dad's Army') were working on a spaceship farce called 'Come Back Mrs Noah' which flopped miserably. Space fiction was generally becoming more popular due to the 1969 space landing and the burgeoning developments in astrophysics; authors like Isaac Asimov and Arthur C. Clarke were making it their own, and films such as Star Wars and Close Encounters were very popular, but I'm sure the seed was sown for Douglas as he avidly read the exciting stories of Dan Dare in his 'Eagle' comic as a child.

The title 'The Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy' so the story goes came to Douglas ten years previously, as he lay in a drunken state in a field on the outskirts of Innsbruck. Being a student, the only holiday he could afford was one where he got about by hitch hiking, and to help his travels he bought a book called 'The Hitch Hiker's Guide to Europe'. "Wouldn't

it be wonderful” he thought as he gazed up at the stars “if the same book could be written for the galaxy?” He promptly forgot this thought, until he started to write Hitch Hiker and was hunting around for a title.

The series was to be a stand-alone set of 6 stories, which he made up as he wrote, but this plan morphed into a continuous tale of a group of disparate travellers. It was first broadcast on Radio 4 in March 1978. When his writing hit the buffers (which it did many times) his friend John Lloyd would assist with ideas, and sometimes actual material, but his contributions were not to be found in later adaptations of Hitch Hiker.

Douglas was notoriously bad at deadlines and famously said “I love deadlines. I love the whooshing noise they make as they go by.” Whilst writing the Hitch Hiker books he suffered such bad writer’s block that his publisher locked him in a hotel room to work, only letting him out for a jog around the park.

The radio series was so well received that it was soon decided that a television series should follow. This was based on the first six episodes of the radio series. Simultaneously, Douglas was writing further stories for Arthur Dent and his friends for the publisher Pan books, so he had radio, TV and book versions of the stories to work on. In addition, there were a number of theatre productions of Hitch Hiker, most famously at the ICA, where members of the audience were weighed, then put on a hovercraft-like seating area, which travelled from scene to scene. The Hitch Hiker stories were quickly snapped up by the American market, and achieved a huge fan base when the radio series was broadcast by National Public Radio.

A Christmas radio series followed, and a 2nd series commissioned for January 1980, and more followed. Hitch Hiker had developed a cult following. The Hitch Hiker novels grew into a trilogy of 5, completed in 1992. Computer games were quick to be developed, some designed by Douglas himself as a great admirer of computers, bringing in a whole new swathe of fans. As early as 1980 onwards he had his mind set on a feature film for the Hitch Hiker stories, making several trips to Hollywood. This plan stalled many times, until Disney bought the rights in 1998, and Douglas was still working on the screenplay up until his death in 2001 of a heart-attack.

The film was finally released in 2005, posthumously rewritten by Karen Kirkpatrick, and was felt by many to be a poor representation of Douglas' wonderful stories. Others agreed, and found the plot line weak, the jokes reduced and the characters diluted and uninspiring. It was a minor box office hit and no sequel was suggested.

Apart from the Hitch Hiker stories, Douglas was involved in many other projects. He was passionate about animal conservation, and made a film and book with Mark Carwardine called 'Last Chance to See' about endangered animal species, and said it was the piece of work that gave him the most pride. He also supported two animal charities 'Save the Rhino' and the 'Diane Fossey Gorilla Fund' and campaigned to extend the moral equality of the great apes with humans.

I have already mentioned his passion for technology in general and computers in particular. He was friends with industrial designer and inventor Clive Sinclair, Ted Nelson, who invented hypertext and the great and the good from Apple computers, owning many many machines himself. In addition to gaming he became founder, director and chief fantasist of 'The Digital Village', a digital media and internet company with which he created 'Starship Titanic' (written about by his friend Terry Jones from Monty Python.) In 1999 Douglas initiated the 'h2g2' collaborative writing project, which was an experimental attempt to make Hitch Hiker a reality, harnessing the collective brainpower of the internet community. He was an ardent and radical atheist, befriending Richard Dawkins who dedicated his famous book 'The 'God Delusion' to him. Dawkins wrote after Douglas' untimely death "Science has lost a friend, literature has lost a luminary, the mountain gorilla and the black rhino have lost a gallant defender."

He had time for a personal life too - in 1991 he married Barrister Jane Belson and they had a daughter Polly a few years later. The family flip flopped between California and London. Sadly Jane died in 2011. Polly went on to study Philosophy.

Although he died so young (he was 49) his name and work live on - a street is named after him in Brazil, the Minor Planet Centre named two planets 'Arthur Dent' and 'Douglas Adams', and May 25th each year is now known by all Hitch Hiker fans as 'Towel Day' when the man and his works are remembered and celebrated.

Douglas' family friend, publisher and official biographer Nick Webb described him thus:

‘For all his warmth and humour, Douglas was sometimes hard to live with, a trait often shared with very creative people. In many ways he was an emotionally fragile yet precociously brilliant child. Children can oscillate between joy and gloom with mercurial rapidity, and anyone who has spent time looking after them knows that nature, for sound Darwinian reasons, has programmed the little so-and-sos with a certain egotism. Douglas was romantic, warm, funny, exuberantly enthusiastic and possessed of a quite exceptional brain; he also had his demons and could be depressed, self-absorbed, sulky and difficult.’

Like the Alice novels, Hitch Hiker lives on - author Eoin Colfer (of *Artemis Fowl* fame) was authorised by Douglas' widow in 2009 to write a sequel to “Mostly Harmless” called ‘And Another Thing’ which was also featured on the radio, and last year was adapted with some of Douglas' unused material to become ‘The Hitch Hiker’s Guide to the Galaxy: Hexagonal Phase’ on Radio 4 to mark the 40th anniversary since the radio series was first aired. This featured a guest performance by Steven Hawking, who was a huge Hitch Hiker fan.

So let's get down the nub of the matter, did Douglas admire the works of Lewis Carroll sufficiently to use them in his own writing? Neil Gaiman, in his excellent biography of Douglas entitled “Don't Panic: The Official Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy Companion” (1979) says

‘ - Of Alice in Wonderland, often cited as an influence, he says (i.e. Douglas) “I read - or rather, had read to me - Alice in Wonderland as a child and I hated it. It really frightened me. Some months ago, I tried to go back to it and read a few pages, and I thought, “This is jolly good stuff, but still ...”

If it wasn't for that slightly nightmarish quality that I remember as a kid I'd've enjoyed it, but I couldn't shake that feeling. So although people like to suggest that Carroll was a big influence - using the Number 42 and all that - he really was not.’

In Jem Roberts' biography of Douglas entitled ‘The Frod: the authorised and very official history of Douglas Adams and the Hitchhiker's Guide to

the Galaxy' (2014) we have another quote from Douglas concerning Carroll when the word "Fit" was first referenced for episodes of Hitch Hiker:

The Producer Geoffrey Perkins '... decided to label each episode 'fits' for the first time, in reference to Lewis Carroll's 'The Hunting of the Snark' which was to give people the impression that Carroll's surrealism was a major influence on Hitchhiker (particularly the Wonderland court's Rule 42: 'All Persons More Than A Mile High Must Leave The Court'), but Douglas protested: "Lewis Carroll, curiously enough, I read when I was a little kid, and it frightened me to bits and I couldn't bare it ever since then ... As far as children's books are concerned, a much stronger influence would be 'Winnie the Pooh'.

So we have two differing accounts of his knowledge of and feelings for the Alice novels. Firstly, that Wonderland was read to him as a child, but he hated it and secondly, that HE had read Lewis Carroll but it was too frightening for him. All very negative and dismissive, yet what more frightening a story could you imagine than a hapless Englishman (Arthur Dent) being forced to become a reluctant space traveller, wrenched away from his dull but familiar life because the earth has been blown up as it was blocking the building of an interstellar hyperlink? As many of you know, the novels outline his travels with many frightening situations and travelling companions and his journey is quest less (apart from trying to find a decent cup of tea) and nonsensical.

As a student of English Literature it is hard to imagine that Douglas wasn't well versed in the world of Lewis Carroll. He admitted to re-reading "a few pages" and thinking that it was 'jolly good stuff', but I suggest he has greatly played down Carroll's influence on his plot, text and themes. Douglas did have the tendency to "forget" his ability to borrow from other authors, as Footlight's Archivist Harry Porter recalled when he pointed out to him that the name Arthur Dent had been borrowed from the author of 'The Plain Man's Pathway to Heaven' - Douglas responded 'uncomfortably.' Some felt he had plagiarised the 1968 novel "Dimension of Miracles" by Robert Sheckley, others that "The Sirens of Titan" by Kurt Vonnegut was an influence, some felt that Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress" and even the Bible had left their mark on the Hitch Hiker novels, which

would have greatly amused the ardent atheist Douglas Adams. But he was an Autolykus “.. a snapper-up of unconsidered trifles” which he stored for recycling purposes.

All Carrollians know that the number 42 was significant in his writing. Martin Gardner in ‘The Annotated Alice’ says

“the number 42 held a special meaning for Carroll. The first Alice book had 42 illustrations. An important nautical rule, Rule 42, is cited in Carroll’s preface to ‘The Hunting of the Snark’, and in Fit the First, stanza 4, the Baker comes aboard the ship with 42 carefully packed cases. In his poem ‘Phantasmagoria’, Canto 1, stanza 16, Carroll gave his age as 42, although he was 5 years younger at the time. In ‘Through the Looking Glass’ the White King sends 4,207 horses and men to restore Humpty Dumpty, and 7 is a factor of 42. Alice’s age in the second book is 7 years and 6 months and $7 \times 6 = 42$. It is probably coincidental that each Alice book has 12 chapters (or 24 in all) and 24 is 42 backwards.”

As Edward Wakeling points out in his article in Jabberwocky
“What I tell You Forty Two Times is True!”

“Did the King choose the first number to come into his head when he invoked Rule 42

‘All persons more than a mile high to leave the court.’ ?

No, Lewis Carroll’s favourite number was 42, a number he found mathematically interesting. Wonderland has 42 illustrations, and its copyright expired in 1907 42 years after publication. Edward provides many more examples of 42 featuring in the Alice novels and ‘The Hunting of the Snark’ in this interesting article and reminds us that at the time of his death Charles Dodgson had been Lewis Carroll for almost 42 years.

Douglas Adams chose the number 42 to be the answer to the ultimate question of ‘What is the meaning of life, the universe and everything’. He knew 42 was a number that Carroll used in his writing when he stated “...although people like to suggest that Carroll was a big influence - using the number 42 and all that - he really was not.”

When working with John Cleese on one of his VideoArts training films, Douglas remembers that he, Cleese and Graham Chapman were all debating what was the funniest two-digit number to give an accountant to say in the film, and that all agreed that 42 was the funniest. You may recall that Eric Idle was in the Jonathon Miller Wonderland film of 1966, and that Douglas knew all the Monty Python team well and it is almost certain that they discussed Carroll and his work. The Pythons used the number in some of their sketches too.

When challenged as to why he chose 42 in this major joke of the story line, Douglas said

“I thought to myself that, if the major joke is the answer to Life, the Universe and Everything and it turns out to be a number, that has got to be a strong joke... What is the most ordinary, workaday number you can find? I didn’t want fractions at the end of it. I don’t even want it to be a prime number. And I guess it mustn’t even be an odd number. There is something slightly more reassuring about even numbers. So I just wanted an ordinary workaday number and chose 42. It’s an unfrighting number. It’s a number you could take home and show to your parents.”

His co-writer John Lloyd gave a different account in the use of 42 as the ultimate answer to life the universe and everything. He said that whilst writing together in their friend’s garage

“... we jointly came up with the number 42 ... which even at the time seemed the most wonderful, striking, simple and hilarious idea.”

How many authors do you know who divide their work into ‘fits’? I can only think of Lewis Carroll and Douglas Adams. In the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms and Theory, a Fit is described as ‘a division of a poem, a canto.

Now hardly ever used.’ As previously mentioned, the BBC producer Geoffrey Perkins was deemed responsible for labelling the episodes of Hitch Hiker into fits, which was not appropriate as it was not a poem - ‘to give people the impression that Carroll’s surrealism was a major influence on Hitch Hiker’. This seems a strange statement given that

Douglas Adams vehemently denied Carroll's colouring of his work, and he must have approved of its use.

Various scenes from Hitch Hiker have a definite Carrollian resonance, and the wonderful Milliways (the restaurant at the end of the universe) IS for many the mad tea party. This restaurant is built on the fragmented remains of an eventually ruined planet which is enclosed in a time bubble and projected forward in time to the precise moment that the universe ends. Whilst eating, the diners watch the whole of creation explode around them, and you can turn up at any time you like because you can book retrospectively. At the restaurant there are a cross section of diners from the entire population of space and time, and regarding payment for your meal as the book says

“...All you have to do is deposit one penny in a savings account in your own era, and when you arrive at the End of Time the operation of compound interest means that the fabulous cost of your meal has been paid for.”

Arthur, like Alice, is not impressed with his fellow diners

“I don't know what this place is ... but I think it gives me the creeps.”

And similarly, Alice says

“I'll never go THERE again! It's the stupidest tea-party I ever was at in all my life!”

A quote from the Milliways scene welcomes scrutiny, it involves Zaphod Beeblebrox (the Galactic President)

“Would you like to see the menu? “the waiter said “or would you like to meet the Dish of the Day?”

“That's cool' said Zaphod, 'we'll meet the meat.”

A large dairy animal approached Zaphod Beeblebrox's table, a large fat meaty quadruped of the bovine type with large watery eyes, small horns and what might almost have been an ingratiating smile on its lips.

“Good evening” it lowed and sat back heavily on its haunches
“I am the main dish of the day. May I interest you in parts of my body? Something off the shoulder perhaps? Braised in a little white wine sauce? ... or the rump is very good. I've been exercising it and eating plenty of grain, so there's a lot of good meat there. Or a casserole of me perhaps?”

The animal promised to shoot itself humanely and Zaphod relishes 4 rare steaks Arthur opts for a green salad.

Compare this to the banquet scene in 'Looking Glass'

“At last the Red Queen began ” Put on the joint!” And the waiters set a leg of mutton before Alice, who looked at it rather anxiously, as she had never had to carve a joint before. You look a little shy; let me introduce you to that leg of mutton” said the Red Queen “Alice - Mutton, Mutton - Alice”. The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a little bow to Alice; and Alice returned the bow, not knowing whether to be frightened or amused.

It's not hard to see how Douglas was inspired by the Looking Glass banquet and developed and modernised the humour for a current readership.

- but the Tea Party/Milliways scene is only one example of Douglas' use of images from the Alice novels, there are many many more.

Alice, as we know, fell down a rabbit hole, whereas Ford Prefect falls down the side of a huge towering office block making rude signs to the office workers inside as he descends.

Alice accepts at the end of her exciting journey round Wonderland that it had all been a dream, and Arthur (in 'So Long and Thanks for all the Fish') accepts his space adventures had been the result of hallucinations. In addition, Arthur wonders, whilst talking to Prosser the council official (who is instrumental in getting Arthur's house demolished to make way for a by-pass)

‘...that his whole life was some kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.’

just like in 'Through the Looking Glass' when Tweedledee tells Alice during their encounter with the sleeping Red King

‘...Why, you're only a sort of thing in his dream!’

Later, Alice says

‘He was part of my dream, of course - but then I was part of his dream, too!’

Madness also is a device used by Douglas. Arthur decides to go mad in 'Life the Universe and Everything' in response to finding himself back on planet Earth, but in prehistoric times. He sticks a rabbit bone in his hair and announces

‘I will go mad!’

‘Good idea, said Ford Prefect ...’I went mad for a while ... did me no end of good..... There is no point in driving yourself mad trying to stop yourself going mad. You might just as well give in and save your sanity for later.’

and as we all know the Cheshire Cat tells Alice

‘We're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad’.

In 'Life the Universe and Everything' Arthur starts to fly, like Alice on a number of occasions in 'Through the Looking Glass'.

In the first Hitch Hiker book, Douglas introduces two argumentative philosophers (upset, as they feared being displaced by the super computer Deep Thought, and they threaten to go on strike). Their arguments are as ludicrous and illogical as the Tweedles, who were obvious inspirations.

In 'The Restaurant at the End of the Universe' a disembodied quiet voice talks to Zaphod Beeblebrox in much the same way as the gnat in 'Through the Looking Glass' talks to Alice in the railway carriage directly in her ear in a small voice. However, Zaphod's voice belongs to the Custodian of the Total Perspective Vortex called Gargravarr.

In the last Hitch Hiker book (Mostly Harmless) a scene in which holographic advertisements appear, and a definite Cheshire Cat image of a giant set of disembodied teeth smilingly advertise toothpaste.

In 'So Long and Thanks for All the Fish' Arthur is talking nostalgically to his girlfriend Fenchurch, when he starts to recall his childhood bedroom and remembers a picture on his bedroom wall of 'rabbits in waistcoats'.

Dodos don't escape either, the book of 'The Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy' is published by Megadodo Publications, and a delicacy at Milliways is Algolian Zylbatburger smothered in a hint of Vulcan Dodo spit.

The drafts of Douglas' work are held at St John's College Cambridge, and on examination some interesting examples exist, including storylines excluded from his finished work.

One was a handwritten idea concerned Arthur and Ford walking through a field and coming across a young Victorian girl. Another involved a character falling through the centre of the Earth searching for an underground passage.

A mushroom (called the Perfiduala Mushroom) featured heavily in another story, but most interesting of all is the very witty courtroom scene which Douglas drafted but failed to use in the Hitch Hiker stories. In one draft Zaphod was on trial and took a truth drug

"We are here to try your future intentions" said the Judge, "and we will discover them if we have to stay all week. We've already wasted enough time - no we haven't, we can't be certain what we've done. All I can say

is what we are going to do. Since you refuse to co-operate willingly, you will be subjected to a Truth Drug. It is very very powerful and you will be unable to resist its effects.”

The erratic and ineffectual judge is very redolent of the King in the Wonderland Court scene who says

“Give your evidence ... or I’ll have you executed, whether you are nervous or not.”

In a further draft to his courtroom scene, a witness takes the truth drug and is very Hatter-like in his inability to answer a straight question, even under the effects of the drug.

It is most interesting that this strong and very funny scene from Hitch Hiker was cut. One can only think that his publisher pointed out the obvious similarity to the courtroom scene in Wonderland as being too obvious.

These are just a few examples of the many shared themes, scenes, and dreams between Douglas and Lewis Carroll.

Both authors used distortions of time and space, played with mathematics, transitions and language, and used concepts of infinite improbability. Both created groundbreaking nonsense stories around quest less journeys and both had no idea where their key characters were heading at the beginning of their tales. Lewis Carroll and Douglas used games as tableaux and movement for their action e.g. chess for Carroll and cricket for Douglas. Incidentally, both authors thought up book titles before their books were written (in Carroll’s case ‘The Hunting of the Snark’ and in Douglas’ *The Hitch Hiker’s Guide to the Galaxy*.) Coincidentally both Alice and Arthur begin with A, have two syllables and the same second initial of P (Pleasance and Philip), although Arthur was called Aleric in the original draft.

Like Lewis Carroll, Douglas Adams used poetry and songs in his books for fun and to add to the plot line. There is the chant used by huge crowds outside the Sirius Cybernetics Corporation Teleport Systems Factory, and

Marvin's wonderful little poem (so like the White Knight's song) which goes

'Now the world has gone to bed' Marvin droned,
Darkness won't engulf my head,
I can see by infra-red,
How I hate the night.
Now I lay me down to sleep,
Try to count electric sheep,
Sweet dream wishes you can keep,
How I hate the night.'

- but of course, the most famous example of verse is in the first Hitch Hiker book when Ford and Arthur meet the dreadful Vogons. As the Guide says

'Vogon poetry is of course the 3rd worst in the Universe. The 2nd worst is that of the Azgoths of Kria. During a recitation by their poet master Grunthos the Flatulent of his poem "Ode to a small lump of Green Putty I found in my Armpit One Midsummer Morning" four of his audience died of internal haemorrhaging and the Head of the Mid Galactic Arts Nobbling Council survived by gnawing one of his own legs off. Grunthos is reported as being disappointed by the poem's reception, and was about to embark on a reading of his 12 book epic entitled 'My Favourite Bathtime Gurgles' when his own major intestine, in a desperate attempt to save humanity, leapt straight up through his neck and throttled his brain.

The very worst poetry of all perished along with its creator, Paul Neil Milne-Johnstone of Redbridge, in the destruction of planet Earth. Vogon poetry is mild in comparison'

Paul Milne-Johnstone was an actual school friend of Douglas and was not amused to find himself immortalised in the Hitch Hiker stories in this way.

An example of Vogon poetry can be heard in this early TV draft script and to me screams Jabberwocky:

“Thy micturitions are to me
As plurdled gabbleblotchits in a lurid bee
Now the jurpling slayjid agrocrustles
Are slurping hagrilly up the axlegrurte
And livid glupules frart and slipulate
Like jowling meated liverslime.”

The vile Prostetnic Vogon Jeltz reads his poetry and gives Ford and Arthur an ultimatum

“Now Earthlings ...I present you with a simple choice! Either die in the vacuum of space, or ...tell me how good you thought my poem was!”

To save their lives Arthur and Ford lie profusely

“I thought some of the metaphysical imagery was particularly effective” said Arthur.

“Interesting rhythmic devices too,” says Ford.

but their attempts fail and they are doomed to be marched to the airlock and flung into deepest space.

Perhaps Douglas was drawing from tutorials endured during his literature degree for this scene.

Some quotes are borrowed (and sometimes adapted) from Carroll shamelessly. The Milliways restaurant advertising slogan reads

“If you’ve done six impossible things this morning, why not round it off with breakfast at Milliways, the Restaurant at the End of the Universe?”

taken from the White Queen in Through the Looking Glass.

And on seeing the interior of an all black spaceship Zaphod says “Weirder and weirder”, certainly borrowed from Alice’s “Curiouser and curiouser”.

The quote from the Red King scene in 'Through the Looking Glass' previously mentioned, about being a part of someone else's dream can't be refuted.

One of the best examples of Douglas Adams' 'borrowings' from Lewis Carroll comes in his pre-Hitch Hiker years. As previously stated he formed a comedy sketch group with fellow students at Cambridge, and one of the sketches they performed (described as 'wonderfully funny') was a structuralist analysis of a railway timetable. Structuralism as a movement was very popular at the time so it was a well received spoof, but likely influenced by 'La Guida di Bragia' Carroll's spoof of a railway timetable performed as a ballad opera written by a young Charles Dodgson for his brothers and sisters as a marionette show a hundred and twenty years earlier.

Douglas Adams knew and enjoyed the work of Carroll greatly, and his reading extended further than the Alice novels. He also wrote a number of books called 'The Meaning of Liff' with John Lloyd where he defines words that summarise a situation without a definition. One such word is a Skeffington - not a common name (who as we all know was Lewis Carroll's uncle) defined as 'the stray pubic hair that gets caught behind a foreskin' - unsurprisingly this did not make publication.

As mentioned previously Douglas adored computers, and Apple computers in particular, and became an Apple Master. These were a group of selected people who used and endorsed Apple products, so Douglas mixed with the movers and shakers at Apple. In 1991 the company produced the first viable electronic book and amongst the first titles published were (of course) 'The Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy' and Martin Gardner's "Annotated Alice".

So far from being scared by, or only mildly interested in Carroll, Douglas was steeped in knowledge of our author and the Alice stories. Remember he was a child of the '60s when many of us discovered Lewis Carroll via Jonathon Miller's wonderful film, Beatles lyrics, the pop art of Peter Blake and a burgeoning of new illustrators of Carroll's books.

Was he nervous of being accused of plagiarism? And does it matter? As we know, plagiarism is a deliberate attribution of authorship to someone else's work of literature providing for criminal or civil liability for infringement of copyright - put simply, issuing work as your own when it is someone else's. It is likely he was aware that 'Alice' was out of copyright.

As we also know, since people could write, their work has been plagiarised. Robert Greene famously described Shakespeare as

"...An upstart crow, beautified with our feathers".

Plagiarism claims can be avoided by authors claiming that their writing is a 'homage' to the original. Douglas shied away from such explanations and strongly denied them. A distinction needs to be drawn between copying individual sentences or phrases (examples of this were given earlier) as being obviously wrong, and in the re-interpretation of older books.

It is true that sub-conscious plagiarism exists, when an author truly believes that their work is a result of their own thinking when there are obvious reasons to believe that this is not true.

Ironically, Douglas felt plagiarised by the screenwriters of the film 'Men in Black' which was a huge commercial success, unlike the lukewarm reception of the Hollywood Hitch Hiker film.

But Douglas didn't just borrow from Carroll. On re-reading the Hitch Hiker novels snippets can be found from P.G. Wodehouse, the radio show 'The Navy Lark', James Bond, Monty Python, Dr Who and one has to wonder about that 50-year phenomenon 'Dad's Army' which boasts the same catch phrase of 'Don't Panic'.

As Jem Roberts wrote in his excellent biography of Douglas

'...recycling would remain an important ecological element of his craft.'

- this recycling referred to his own earlier work as well as borrowing from the work of others.

Douglas Adams, like Lewis Carroll, was a writer who was a paradigm shifter, super-creative, seriously funny and hyper-intelligent, but an acknowledgement of one of his strongest literary influences is overdue.

Sarah Stanfield has been a member of the Lewis Carroll Society since 1975, and has served on the Committee as both Chairman and Secretary. She has given talks to the Society on Lewis Carroll's sisters, his illustrator Gertrude Thomson, on pirated editions of Alice, and the parodist Brenda Girvin before turning her attention to Douglas Adams.

Escaping Justice in Wonderland: An adaptation of a Paper given at the Glasgow International Fantasy Conference 2018

Karen Gardiner

Prosecution is not persecution. It would be an evil day for England when it should be recognised that to appeal to the majesty of justice is to contravene truth and justice”

Edward Pusey, *The Times* 19th Feb 1863

“Dr Pusey calls an appeal to the Court for the adjudication of small debts an “appeal to the majesty of justice”. He has a beautiful and enviable power of defying ridicule. I quote the words – I do not comment on them.”

F.D. Maurice, *The Times* 20th Feb 1863

THEY passed beneath the College gate;
And down the High went slowly on;
Then spake the Undergraduate
To that benign and portly Don:

“They say that justice is a Queen
A Queen of awful Majesty
Yet in the papers I have seen
Some things that puzzle me.

Lewis Carroll, *The Majesty of Justice*, 5th March 1863

Alice does not ask to go to Wonderland. Her curiosity leads her there, and she finds, once in this alternative world, that it is at least as unjust as the one that she has left behind, with apparently senseless rules and despotic leaders. Wonderland is not an escape. It is, in the end, a place she must make her escape from, if she is not to be unjustly sentenced.

Between the completion of *Alice’s Adventures Underground* (the story told to the children on the river) and the much-expanded *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, which would eventually be published, the “Jowett case” hit the headlines in the British Press. A trial was brought against Jowett (Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford) by Edward Pusey (Dodgson’s sponsor at

Oxford) and others, on the grounds of heresy. This produced, Carroll writes in his diary, “a flurry of letters to the ‘Times’” leading to correspondence about the concept of justice itself with Carroll’s close acquaintance the theologian F. D. Maurice. The 1863 letters from Carroll to Maurice have unfortunately been lost, but the lengthy replies from Maurice remain in Surrey History Centre’s Lewis Carroll collection and have only been partially published until now.

This paper will reflect on what the Maurice letters can tell us about Carroll’s shifting perspective on the justice of the Jowett case, including looking at his poem “The Majesty of Justice” which references both the Jowett case and the Wonderland story. It will argue that Wonderland’s justice system may not be so fantastic after all. Nor may it be so easy to escape, since its genesis is in Carroll’s everyday world.

As all Carrollians know, Carroll’s famous story had its beginning in a story told to three girls on a river trip in Oxford. On the request of Alice Liddell, he wrote down the story to present to her, completing the initial manuscript in February 1863. The story was called *Alice’s Adventures Underground*, and it formed the basis of the book we now know as *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, published at the end of 1865.

Wonderland is a significantly expanded version of the original text. The original contains no Cheshire Cat, no tea party and only a very short trial scene. Its Mouse’s Tail is less violent and unjust, and its Queen is less prominent. In short, the published *Wonderland* is much more adversarial in nature and more concerned with issues of justice than its original version. This paper sets out some possible links between a contentious ecclesiastical court case in 1863 with the 1865 *Wonderland* story as we know it.

In 1855 the Rev Benjamin Jowett had been appointed to the post of Regius Professorship of Greek at Oxford. His annual salary of £40 (set by Henry VIII and never raised) was open to question from the start, given that the Canons at Christ Church were receiving around £1000 at the time. A campaign was initiated to raise the salary, but Jowett’s contribution to the controversial publication *Essays and Reviews* in 1860 impacted severely on his case and the motion to increase his salary kept being defeated until 1865. *Essays and Reviews* had been an attempt by its authors to provide a Broad-Church voice to those who felt there was felt a need to answer the questions thrown up by Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* with a more

academic and scientific treatment of the Bible and Christian thought. Jowett's contribution was "On the Interpretation of Scripture", and he famously stated in it that the Bible should be read as any other book was. Opinion on the orthodoxy and acceptability of *Essays and Reviews* was very divided, and the controversy soon spread from the religious to the popular press. The Church of England became embroiled in a series of protracted legal battles against the book's contributors, whilst dozens of pamphlets were written opposing it and numerous petitions were signed by thousands of clergy and lay people. From cartoons in *Punch* to editorials and letters in the *Times*, the established Church was criticised for being too lenient *and* too dogmatic, and the various trials and appeals dominated the both the Church and the press for the first half of the 1860s.

The question of Jowett's pay continued in Oxford, the debate being inevitably informed by the questions over the court cases of two of his fellow essayists. Following a meeting of promulgation in 1861, where Lewis Carroll was present and spoke regarding Jowett's potential increase in salary, he wrote his first of three spoof pamphlets that he would contribute on the Jowett case. It was entitled *Endowment of the Greek Professorship* and was originally published anonymously. According to his diary, and his nephew and first biographer Stuart Collingwood, Carroll appeared at this time to consider to Jowett's theological views heretical and also to believe that the stipend should not be increased – a position he would later move from.

As time went by, Edward Pusey, Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, prominent high Churchman and sponsor of Lewis Carroll's studentship, gradually became more uncomfortable with his dual role of promoting Jowett's rise in salary (which kept being defeated) and simultaneously accusing him of heresy in *Essays and Reviews*, and he began to believe that Jowett should be prosecuted. There was difficulty in finding an appropriate court since Jowett's role as a member of staff at the university prevented him from being tried in the ecclesiastical courts like the other essayists. Eventually Pusey took legal advice as to the advisability of trying him for heresy in the Vice chancellor's court (a court more normally used for the settling of small debts). Phillimore, Pusey's lawyer, drew on Jowett's 1855 essay on the atonement as well as *Essays and Reviews* claiming

that they could bring forward charges against Jowett on this basis. By February 1863, they were ready to proceed.

February 1863 was an important month for Lewis Carroll too. By the 10th Feb 1863, the *Alice's Adventures Underground* text (that is, the original tale intended for Alice Liddell) was finished, though extraordinary changes would be made to the text prior to its publication. A week earlier, he had attended St Peter's Vere Street, F.D. Maurice's Church, as he had been wont to do over the previous year. He wrote in his diary:

“There was Communion, and as there seemed to be no-one to help him I sent him my card. This lucky accident led to my making his acquaintance. I went back to lunch with him and Mrs Maurice, and after the afternoon service went to the MacDonald's.”

Maurice was a controversial Churchman in his own right. In 1853 he had lost his post at Kings College London for writing *Theological Essays*, (a book that Carroll held in his personal library). *Theological Essays* challenged the doctrine of eternal punishment (and Carroll himself, much later in his life, would tackle the theology of eternal punishment drawing on Maurice's ideas). Maurice was a significant influence on two other children's writers: Charles Kingsley, with whom he collaborated in the Christian Socialist movement, and Carroll's great friend, George MacDonald. Maurice and Carroll initially held very different views on the Jowett case, and in November 1861, Maurice had commented in a letter to a friend on the decision of promulgation earlier that month, saying that the decision to withhold a reasonable stipend for Jowett was “a triumph for mob rule”.

The case against Jowett in the Chancellor's court (referred to as the “small debts and heresies court” by Punch) began on 13th Feb 1863. The case was initially delayed for a week as Jowett's defence challenged the validity of the court. A *Times* article appeared, criticising the prosecution and accusing Pusey and his co-prosecutors of being “short sighted men with a rooted distrust of the power of truth to abide the ordeal of free enquiry” and concluding, rather piously, “We may pity Dr Pusey and his co-prosecutors, for they know not what they do”. Carroll followed what he

described in his diary as the “usual flurry of letters to the *Times*” on the subject closely.

Pusey’s response to the *Times* article on the 19th was unsurprisingly combative, warning of a “systematic attempt to revolutionize the Church of England”. He insisted that the Church had a duty to prevent individuals falling into error, and to teach the truth laid down in its creeds and formularies, stating his belief that Jowett had contravened these. In a statement that that would be echoed in letters, poems and parody, Pusey defended himself saying,

“Prosecution is not persecution. It would be an evil day for England when it should be recognised that to appeal to the majesty of justice is to contravene truth and justice.”

Maurice’s letter in response to Pusey was scathing. Claiming he had no sympathy for the theological position of either Pusey or Jowett, he accused both, saying they confuse and “bewilder the consciences of simple men and women”. Maurice argued that both Pusey and Jowett’s work may be used for good by God, but not if they insist on stifling one another’s voices through the courts. He feared the narrowing of theology in a manner which was “inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of our formularies” and the turning of the Church of England into a Sect. He reminded readers that Jowett was not trying to silence Pusey, and Dr Pusey’s attempts to silence Jowett must be resisted. In response to Pusey’s appeal to the “Majesty of Justice” Maurice simply says,

“Dr Pusey calls an appeal to the Court for the adjudication of small debts an “appeal to the majesty of justice”. He has a beautiful and enviable power of defying ridicule. I quote the words – I do not comment on them.”

As the argument over the validity of the court continued in the press, Carroll wrote in his diary on the 21st Feb that he had written to Maurice, as he felt there was so much he had misunderstood. Unfortunately, Carroll’s letter has not survived, but Maurice’s response is in the Surrey History Centre and has kindly been made available by them and by Elisabeth Mead, Carroll’s great grandniece. Edward Wakeling transcribes

and publishes a significant portion of the letter in Carroll's diaries, but Maurice's writing is exceptionally difficult to read and is more fully transcribed here than in any other publication. The transcription for this, and Maurice's further letter to Carroll on the same subject on the 2nd March, can be found at the back of this paper, with the previously unpublished elements underlined.

In the letters, Carroll and Maurice appear to be reflecting on the very nature of justice: is justice being done, or are those on trial escaping justice? In particular, the letters focus on the relationship between being persecuted and prosecuted – an idea highlighted by the *Times* article and Pusey's letter. Carroll, it appears, has charged Maurice with being a persecutor of Oxford, an idea Maurice refutes.

Maurice claims that Carroll is using, "respectable Old Bailey arguments", and that such arguments are not worthy of spiritual men. "In the mouth of Edwin James" he says, "anyone might admire their ingenuity" (Edwin Jones was a Barrister and MP, and the first member of the Queen's Counsel to have ever been disbarred for misconduct in 1861). Maurice's argument in this letter appears to focus on the way in which secular legal matters and spiritual priorities become mixed, leading to a degradation of both, and the moral and ethical corruption of the young. Using legislation to control theological thought was an anathema to him. Maurice is also saying that by challenging Jowett in court, Pusey is treating the Church of England as a Sect rather than a National Church. In using Dr Phillimore's legal opinion as justification for his actions in prosecuting, Pusey is failing to take theological responsibility for his actions.

It appears from the totality of Maurice's first letter, that Carroll had attempted to defend Pusey in most, if not all, matters when writing to him, and that Maurice was resolute in his defence of his own initial letter to the *Times*.

Letters to the *Times* continued, and on the 28th Feb the newspaper reported that the assessor had decided against prosecution of Jowett based on concerns over whether the Court had proper jurisdiction on the matter. The prosecution immediately lodged an appeal.

On the 2nd March, Maurice replied to Carroll's second letter giving significant focus to exploring the very nature of justice. This is the letter which seems to be key to what we know was a change of heart for Carroll. Carroll had apparently claimed in his letter that Maurice must at least acknowledge that "dry justice" had been done. Maurice refutes this, claiming that the pedantic nature of the law in this case makes real justice impossible, the lawyers' tendency being "to avoid occasions of rendering to every man his due when this can be avoided, to profit by flaws in letters and subtle quirks which equality gets rid of." Maurice further claims that the Christian has a duty to a higher understanding of justice than academia or the legal system can allow. For Maurice justice is not justice unless it contains within itself, mercy. Thus, the court is an inappropriate place for the Christian to find justice.

Maurice also challenges Carroll's assertion that there are certain (and he quotes Carroll directly here) "Christian Truths, which if a man in an accredited position as teacher, shall openly deny, it becomes the duty of those who have accredited him, to protest against, and if possible, to prevent his any longer to act for us with their authority". Maurice claims there is confusion in Carroll's argument between the absolute truth, and one's interpretation of truth. He concludes with the assertion that Pusey is indeed persecuting rather than prosecuting. In other words, Pusey's understanding of justice is deeply flawed and has the potential to lead to great injustice.

Shortly after Carroll received this second letter from Maurice, he recorded in his diary,

"A subject for a poem occurred to me before I got up, and during the day I wrote the whole, except four lines. I called it "The Majesty of Justice," and have substituted it for "Size and Tears" in No 11 of College Rhymes."

The Majesty of Justice is clearly a comment on Jowett's escape from trial, and his recent correspondence with Maurice. In the second verse, Carroll writes,

“They say that justice is a Queen
A Queen of awful Majesty
Yet in the papers I have seen
Some things that puzzle me.”

The Queen in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland is, as we know, quite the reverse of true justice: “Sentence first, verdict afterwards” she barks. The Queen has a minor (though violent) part in the initial manuscript of the river trip stories (which according to Carroll’s later diary was completed prior to this poem) but she becomes more central, as does the trial scene, when Carroll heavily edited the manuscript. Although it seems likely that the Queen in this poem (and possibly the Queen in Wonderland too) primarily represents an image of justice itself (albeit an inadequate kind of justice), there may also be a reference here to Dr Phillimore, the Queen’s Advocate who prosecuted the essayists on behalf of the Bishop of Salisbury, and acted as legal advisor to Pusey, and who is mentioned a number of times in Maurice’s letters to Carroll.

To the question “What is justice?” Carroll provides a number of comic solutions in this poem: is it the dress? Is it parades? before concluding that it must, in fact, be in the wig that the judge wears. Since we know that Carroll frequently re-uses ideas, words and even characters in his fiction, it may well be relevant that in the original illustrations that Carroll drew for *Alice’s Adventures Underground*, the King in the trial scene is a traditional playing card King. In the changes he made to the manuscript following his correspondence with Maurice, however, Carroll describes the King sitting with a wig underneath his crown giving him a ridiculous look (illustrated memorably by Tenniel). A reference back, perhaps, to the poem *Majesty of Justice* and the absurdity of a theological trial taking place in a trial used more properly for the collection of small debts.

Since the “Majesty of Justice” was a phrase used by Pusey’s detractors to make fun of him, it seems almost certain that the use of it as a title in this parody of a poem, indicate a changing, and less supportive view of Pusey by Carroll than is indicated in the letters to him by Maurice. Certainly, his penning of this poem suggests that he recognises *something* of the absurdity in the situation. Although he appeared to have sympathy with the position that Oxford had found itself in, we know from his diaries that by March

1864, Carroll voted (in the minority) to increase Jowett's stipend significantly. It may be that *The Majesty of Justice* poem indicates a turning point in his thinking.

Jowett's trial finally began on March 20th, 1863. An academic common lawyer acted as judge and was given the remit to turn what had been a formally civilian court into, essentially, a court of common law. Jowett's lawyer protested that the court had no jurisdiction in spiritual matters, but the judge disagreed, provided it could be shown that Jowett had been guilty of breaking one of the university statutes. However, since it was uncertain whether one of the statutes had in fact been broken, the case was dismissed – it was nothing more than a house of cards.

Pusey continued to believe that Jowett had escaped justice. Maurice continued to write that it was an injustice to have brought him to trial in the first place. And Carroll, as well as writing three pamphlets (*Endowment of the Greek Professorship*, *Methods of Evaluations according to Pi*, and another pamphlet written in November 1863 which has sadly not survived) and the poem *Majesty of Justice* on the Jowett case between 1860 and 1865, rewrote Alice's Adventures Underground between 1863 and 1865 until it resembled the argumentative, legally indefensible Wonderland we know today. In an inadequate court, Alice is interrogated about irrelevant details, and arguably persecuted rather than prosecuted, despite it not even being her trial. The Queen is convinced of the guilt of the Knave before she has even heard the letter he supposedly wrote, just as the writers of *Essays and Reviews* were condemned by some who had not even read their book, and she demands sentence before verdict. The early 1860s show Carroll, like many of his contemporaries, to be preoccupied with Church law, and the ways in which theological, educational and legal proceedings are enacted majestically or otherwise. In the very centre of these questions, stands F. D. Maurice, the Priest at Carroll's most regular Church, his correspondent on matters of law and grace in the Church and beyond, challenging Carroll's presumptions and influencing his writing.

Alice escapes Wonderland and the injustice she finds there. She is not judged, but rather she judges the court and finds it wanting. In Carroll's ecclesiastical everyday world, Jowett eventually escaped trial and

impecunity when his salary was finally raised to a respectable level, but he never wrote again on Biblical criticism and he never escaped the notoriety acquired through *Essays and Reviews*. Alice escaped her injustice; Jowett was consumed by his.

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F. D. Maurice to Lewis Carroll letters regarding the Jowett Case
(Previously un-transcribed parts are underlined)

Feb 23rd 1863

Dear Mr Dodgson,

I thank you for your frank and friendly letter.

I cannot plead guilty to the charge of becoming your persecutor at Oxford as from statements in the newspapers. I have read some statements in the newspapers, eg reports of speeches of Dr Pusey, Dr Hawkins and other opposers of the point, and letters of Professor Heurtley, Dr Pusey and others to newspapers in defence of their conduct. These have certainly had great weight in determining my opinion. Otherwise I have been indebted but very little to newspaper arguments or newspaper authority. (I have been familiar for at least a twelvemonth, with the arguments by which you justify the refusal of the University to stop from increasing the allowance of the Professor of Greek. I think of them now as I thought of them at first. They are very respectable Old Bailey arguments; in the mouth of Edwin James*, any one might admire their ingenuity. They just go far enough in the worldly line to make the case look not absolutely intolerable as a mercantile transaction. They then introduce just enough of theology into the question, to make religious more comfortable with themselves in doing what they could not like to do as gentlemen if they had not that motive to influence them. So they construct a case which looks plausible in their eyes, which had an ordinary layman to say, "Uncommon practice that! It would not do in the Courts, of course in the college of divines it is just the proper thing" Now that is language which I believe it is utterly bad for our sons to hear. We send them to Oxford to hear high and sound morality. We trust them to learn the bearing and the practice of Church Gentlemen. All these instances of sailing close to the wind, confuses them and degrades their standards of ethics. When you

throw faith in to make the balance right, you degrade that too and you make it odious.

Dr Pusey's letter in the Times would have made me hate the prosecution which is to cover and endorse this previous injustice, if I had not hated it before. The points which I selected for comment are but those I consider the worst. They applied to the practice of Sects. "Any Sect would take the case he was taking". Why of course it would! Every sect must affirm the opinion of some man like Mr Jowett or Dr Pusey or Dean Close to be the right opinion and must answer them, and must if possible answer others too. But is the Church of England a Sect? Does it exist under the conditions of a Sect?no to repudiate those conditions ..? Is it not to say that neither to opinions of a Mr Jowett, or Dr Pusey or Dean Close have we sworn or will we adhere. The other we are not bound to anathematise that we may glorify that one. Mr Pitt said when he heard Mr Fox's argument for the Regency Bill "Now I'll un-whig the Gentleman". It is not necessary to "un-church" Dr Pusey. He has unchurched himself by this example to the Sects. [* cf Regency Act 1811]

Again, he quoted Dr Phillimore's opinion (1) as if it were a great authority about the "central" doctrines of Christianity (2) to overawe this Court for the "majesty" of which he appeals. Of course every client consults his council whether his case is a good one to go with into a Court at all and to which court he should go. The opinion is worth something in determining his own conduct. But what is Dr Phillimore's judgement to this, or to any divine who had confessed the creeds of the Church? What a new theory of Churchmanship it is to proclaim a respectable lay preacher as a Pope! What a new theory of justice to tell the Oxford judges who are guessing as to the merits of the case "This learned lawyer has sorted it!" You say there is nothing more absurd in trying cases of theory before a Court which is commonly occupied as the Vice Chancellor's is occupied, than in trying a case of murder before a Court which has sometimes to try cases of shooting a hare. The analogy would be applicable, if your whole object, the only plan...set, was not to produce a certain moral effect. A teacher is said to be undermining the faith of the undergraduates, you prosecute him before a judicial which those undergraduates have been used to associate with that which is mean and....You will make questions of faith look.....

2. *(only odd words and phrases decipherable)* FDM appears to argue that Jowett's book written several years ago should not be used in evidence against him. No other court would accept this as evidence.

In the interests of Oxford, in the interests of common morality, in the name of Almighty God, I protest against your proceedings and...the apologies which have been made for these.

Very truly yours,

F. D. Maurice

2nd Mar 1863

Dear Mr Dodgson,

I welcome the appearance of your name affixed to one clause of the protest, as a proof that you agree with me substantially about the mischievousness of this prosecution at Oxford, however you may think of it in reference to Mr Jowett I know you may disapprove of my arguments against it.

I have been hindered by many engagements from answering your letter before answering your letter before. It was too elaborate and worthy of consideration to be replied to hastily.

You begin by assuming my assent to the proposition that at all events a dry legal justice was done to Mr Jowett in the question of his salary, however I may complain of the University for failing in generosity. It is implied, you think, in my phrases about the notions of Old Bailey Lawyers respecting...that I should go with you to this extent.

I am sorry that I cannot. The Oxford Schools have chosen Aristotle as the exponent of moral obligations. They teach him to their pupils. He is, we all know, very precise and distinct on the subject of justice. Now the Old Bailey Lawyer's notion of justice, it seems to me, is not only unlike Aristotle's, but as nearly as possible the reverse of it. To sail as near to the wind as possible to avoid occasions of rendering to every man his due when this can be avoided, to profit by flaws in letters and subtle quirks which equality gets rid of. This is his function. When the Oxford divine imitates him, it is not that he follows strict justice – according to his own recognised definition of it – it is that he becomes unjust.

But we have a higher standard than Aristotle! Certainly we know the Sermon on the Mount raises the Aristotelian justice to a much higher power, bases it on a much deeper ground. "Do to others as you would

they should do to you is the higher power.” “Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven” is the deeper ground.

And what I complain of the University is that it calls on the Gospel to support this morality which is immeasurably below Aristotle’s, to justify it in changing his standard for that of the legal quibbler. For the honour of God and the Bible, the University adopts the common practice which the Pagan Moralist and the code of the English Gentleman would condemn. This I maintain is wrong in itself and dangerous to our children.

2. Your next proposition is that there are certain “Christian Truths, which if a man in an accredited position as teacher, shall openly deny, it becomes the duty of those who have accredited him to protest against, and if possible, to prevent his any longer to act for us with their authority”

I copy the words; you will perceive at once the error of contradiction which is in them. I should be ashamed to take notice of such an inadvertence if I did not think that it is almost inevitable that an error in the thought is answerable for the mistake in the language. You did not, of course, mean that the accreditors were to protest against the Truths which the accredited denies. But you did feel that the accreditors and the accredited were both in some way committed to the Truths, and that the accreditors were to protest against the way in which the accredited spoke of them. Now this changes the issue altogether. We are occupied about a way, a right or a wrong way, of dealing with certain truths. One way, you think amounts to a denial of them. It may be so; you who hold that opinion must do what you can to counteract that denial. But you have no business to insist that I, because I confess the truth, should approve your method of counteracting the denial or even your opinions about the Truths. And this is precisely what I find Dr Pusey and Dr Ogilvie doing. They are identifying truths with opinions on behalf of the great Christian truths which they think they are defending – because I maintain them to be Truths of God and not opinions of theirs or mine or any man’s. I will, so help me God, struggle that they may not rot this vital and eternal distinction. Now when they and you plead that the Church may do “a festino” whatever a Sect would do, you extinguish it altogether. A Sect exists to hold opinions, a Church to bear witness of Truths. The Sect holds its opinions. The Church is upheld by its Truths. They are not its Truths. It only points to them. It only says to men: they are for you. Believe in them.

Dr Pusey persecutes not prosecutes. If I agreed with him, I should dismiss this miserable age which can only persecute. I should long for the blessed.....that the Wisdom of the Eternal God, not the wit of man, had confounded every attempt to glorify opinions in the name of Truth and by methods which Truth abhors. I welcome the necessity of our times. I see in them the step to the vindication of theology in its purest and divinest character. We shall begin to believe in the Holy Ghost and Glorious Trinity when we believe that it is the Name of the God in whom we live and move and have our being, that it is not a notion or conceit of ours. We shall begin to believe in the Atonement when we believe that God actually sent His only Begotten Son to His Father's right hand; when we are therefore ashamed of our clumsy and profane attempts to compress it into a theory.

3.I think I need not say much on your third perspective. If I admitted a persecution to have an end – like righteousness, Charity, Peace – if I admitted it .. a command like Thou shalt not commit adultery, of course I should say with you, “ ... the end. , obey the commandment, leave the consequences to God”. But can only be an instrument. It may be a forbidden instrument. You cannot show anywhere, that it is a good precept as it ministers to some good object. If as I think it must.... to the object of making some children unbelievers and of destroying their sense of real distinctions, I have a right to protest aspects of it on that ground. Consequences are involved in the

.....I oppose persecution believing that you multiply the dangers a thousandfold and introduce many others.

Very truly yours,
F D Maurice

Karen Gardiner has a multidisciplinary background in theology, psychology and the arts. She has recently presented *Escaping from Wonderland* at the Glasgow International Fantasy Conference, and having presented *Alice's Apocalypse* at the Theology and Popular Culture conference last year, she is now on the steering group for that network. Karen is a Priest in the Church of England and is currently based in the Vale of York.

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The Lewis Carroll Society was founded in 1969 to promote interest in the life of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson and the study of the works published under his real name and under his famous pseudonym, Lewis Carroll. The Society's large international membership includes representatives of the Dodgson family and the world's leading Carroll authorities as well as major libraries and institutions. Members receive issues of the *Carrollian* as well as *Lewis Carroll Review* (containing reviews of new books, plays, exhibitions, etc) and *Bandersnatch* the Society's newsletter). The Society also engages in a number of activities including organising conferences, meetings and publishing major works such as Lewis Carroll's diaries.